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Abstract 
The mobile offshore development unit (MODU) market is unique in that the majority of the rig 
fleet is owned by independent rig management firms and leased to oil and gas companies for 
exploration and production. Managing a firm’s fleet is a complex profit maximization process by 
which managers decide what rigs to keep active in search of contracts, temporarily idle or cold 
stack, reactivate from cold stacking, upgrade, or sell. Despite the substantial financial 
implications of these decisions, empirical research on the MODU market has been limited. We 
therefore take advantage of a substantially larger dataset and utilize existing models as a starting 
point to describe both the idling and rig day rates for active rigs. For idling behavior, the decision 
to cold stack is presented using a real option framework. The contract day rate model is described 
using a multiple linear regression. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine existing models and 
to suggest additional factors driving both idling behavior and rig day rates. In general, these 
decisions are seen as being driven by a rigs utility via observable and unobservable heterogeneity, 
market conditions, as well as a firms’ size. In particular, lagged factor prices and rig utility 
proxies such as rig moves across geographic regions are the best determinants of rig idling 
options while most rig characteristics are otherwise mixed. After controlling for regional and time 
effects, the main determinants of day rates are utilization rates and rig moves across regions. 
Factor prices, on the other hand, have no significant effect on rig rates. Through a better 
understanding of idling and contract day rate dynamics, our research is relevant to rig owning and 
operating firms as well as the financial institutions that support them.  
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1. Introduction 
The need for offshore oil and gas has always been driven by a combination of dwindling 
onshore production and relatively high factor prices. These high prices have justified the capital 
investments to survey, explore, and potentially produce a given offshore field (Kaiser and Snyder, 
2013a). While stylized, this vignette is demonstrative of both the economic challenges faced by 
offshore market participants and the driving forces behind more ambitious – deeper and farther 
offshore – projects over time.  
Despite the recent shifts in the global energy mix – particularly from unconventional, and 
predominantly onshore, sources – oil remains and is expected to remain the leading primary 
energy source through 2035 (IEA, 2013). Of the approximately 90 million barrels of oil produced 
daily around the world, 30 million barrels per day (mbpd) are produced offshore and 13 mbpd are 
produced on a mobile offshore development unit (MODU): a generic distinction given to the 
collective group of jackups, semisubmersibles (semisubs), and drillships (BP, 2013; Kaiser and 
Snyder, 2013a). The offshore market’s share of total oil and gas production is also expected to 
remain at this same level well into the next decade, sustained primarily from an increase in 
production from MODUs (Infield Systems, 2012).  
 Unlike their fixed offshore peers, MODUs are capable of working farther from shore and 
in multiple locations over the course of their operational life. Furthermore, third party rig owners, 
rather than oil and gas companies (O&G), own the majority of the MODU fleet.  Rig owners 
provide a sound partner for an oil and gas company to mitigate the risk of operating in the 
offshore environment. While rig owners will not typically build a new rig without a contract for 
exploration or production work in hand (Corts and Singh, 2004), this has never encouraged O&G 
to be more than a minor player in the MODU fleet: of the more than 1,400 MODUs currently 
operating, less than five percent are wholly owned by O&G (RigLogix, 2014).  
Contracts for a newly built rig can vary in length from a few weeks to many years, after 
which a rig either extends its contract via an embedded contract option or can make a number of 
decisions with respect to its operational status. First, and what is the most frequent decision, a rig 
can re-enter the (spot) market in search of new contracts or tenders. If an active rig is not 
currently under contract, this is known as a ready stacked rig. Occasionally a rig will move 
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regions as part of its contract conditions. The costs associated with moving a rig, regional rig 
specifications, and local regulations are legitimate reasons to consider the MODU market within 
a regional framework (Kaiser and Snyder, 2013b; Osmundsen et al., 2008). While still relatively 
rare, rig movements have almost doubled as a share of total contracts from 2004 to 2013 (from 
almost 6% to 12%) and thus are worth investigating closer. Second, a rig can temporarily idle 
itself in a process known as cold stacking. A cold stacked rig is stored in safe location – harbor or 
shallow bay – and cannot re-enter the market without incurring substantial financial costs 
(anywhere between 10-30 million USD), time (one to two months), and potential specialist labor 
shortages (Kaiser and Snyder, 2013a). Third, a rig can undergo modifications or upgrades in 
order to become more competitive relative to newer rigs. Modifications also occur as part of a 
contract with a company that guarantees said rig work after the completion of modifications. 
Finally, a rig can be sold to a competitor or for scrap.  
Despite these trends in offshore oil markets, relatively little empirical work has been 
written on rig owner’s decision making in the MODU market. The existing literature has focused 
largely on rig managers or oil producers (for example, see Mauritzen, 2014; Kellog, 2010; 
Osmundsen et al., 2009; Mohn and Osmundsen, 2008; Hamilton, 2008; Lee and Ni, 2002). In 
light of the large capital costs or the specialized labor associated with operating a rig, our 
understanding of the effects of both market forces and rig heterogeneity on both real option 
values of keeping a rig active versus cold stacked and contract day rates earned by rig owners 
deserves to be developed further. An empirical analysis of the relevant factors effecting day rates 
or option values would be a gain to both the operational divisions of rig owning or operating 
firms – identifying what factors drive both their own and their competitors’ decision making – as 
well as the institutions and investors responsible for financing said firms. Their benefits would 
come from a more sound understanding of MODU market dynamics.  
 Utilizing a global MODU data series, the aim of our research is to examine and replicate 
existing cold stacking real option and contract rate formation models, originally presented by 
Corts (2008) and Osmundsen et al. (2012) respectively. Both models claim that higher 
specification rigs can command a higher contract rate and are also less likely to be cold stacked 
due to their high utility. After controlling for firm size, rig type, region and time period, Corts 
proved that this likelihood of cold stacking a rig is positively related to the age and negatively 
related to the rig water depth and the deck load of the rig. He also found that larger firms are 
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more likely to stack and reactivate rigs at a higher frequency than smaller firms. Corts concluded 
this was due to a larger firms’ ability to retain labor. Osmundsen et al. (2012) showed that 
offshore rig day rates are positively related to the utilization rates, factor prices – gas prices in 
particular– and are significantly effected by contract characteristics, such as contract length and 
lead time. 
These models and their hypotheses form the basis of our research questions. While testing 
the reproducibility of published research has in itself become a growing component of published 
empirical work (Economist, 2014), the additional contributions of our thesis to the existing 
literature are fourfold. First, it is our inclusion of factor prices, all available rig types, and all 
available global regions to our model specifications. Second,  is our treatment and inclusion of 
latent variables, such as rig moves, to better understand the effect unobservable heterogeneity has 
on cold stacking and contract day rates. Thirdly, rather than frame the cold stacking decision as a 
binary decision – active versus cold stacked – we include a multinomial logistic model. While the 
real option value of a rig is not disputed – serving as a floor on the operational losses incurred by 
a firm – a multinomial model allows us to determine the effect of rig heterogeneity on the idling 
as well as all other aforementioned decisions available to rig owners.  Finally, we include 
additional explanatory variables in order to more properly specify our day rate model. 
Given our extensive dataset, we take the opportunity to examine some of the market 
trends we observe from our series, combined with a general overview of the MODU market, and 
the relevant descriptive statistics used in our models. This is presented in section 2. Otherwise, 
the remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3 presents the literature review. 
Section 4 introduces the data used in our analysis. Section 5 lays out the theoretical framework 
for our models. Section 6 presents our empirical results, and section 7 offers our concluding 
remarks and avenues for future research. 
2. The MODU market: A brief overview 
As presented in the introduction, the MODU market is composed of three primary rig 
types: jackups, semisubs and drillships. Secondary rig types are both few in number and rarely 
operate in the same environments as primary rigs – shallow, inland, and small discoveries versus 
deep, offshore, and large discoveries (Schempf, 2007). For this reason all secondary rigs – rigs 
	  	   7 
unfit for ocean usage – will be excluded from our analysis. The terms rig and MODU will be used 
interchangeably in the remainder of this paper. 
Jackups, largely due to design specifications, – a series of cantilevered legs that must be 
affixed to the ocean floor or a man-made sea bed pad – operate in water no deeper than 600 feet 
(RigLogix, 2014). Semisubs and drillships are capable of drilling in significantly deeper water by 
maintaining their location at a drill site via dynamic positions (DP) or mooring lines (Noble, 
2013). Existing semisubs have a maximum water depth of 12,000 feet and drillships are presently 
capable of operating in water as deep as 27,000 feet (RigLogix, 2014).  
The higher specifications required of semisubs and drillships compared to jackups 
translate into both higher operating costs and higher average contract day rates for rig owners [see 
figure 1]. In a competitive market, the day rates charged are the best available proxy for the costs 
incurred by the operators (Corts, 2008). Rarely do the day rates of drillships or semisubs equal or 
drop below those of jackups. However, this has occurred in 1997 and late 2000 for drillships and 
semisubs respectively. This highlights a crucial dynamic: in poor market conditions both 
drillships and semisubs can be contracted out for work by O&G to do the work normally carried 
out by jackups. The opposite however, is technically not feasible.  
 
Figure 1: MODU Count and Day Rates 1996-2014 
 
Source: RigLogix, 2014.  
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The operational advantages of drillships and semisubs notwithstanding, the majority of 
the MODU market is made up of jackups [see figure 2]. From 1990-20141, the number of active 
(non-cold stacked) jackups have made up an average of 66% of the MODU market. This figure 
has dropped from that average since 2008 and is presently around 62%, due to a relatively large 
number of drillships and semisubs entering the market. Net additions to the drillship and semisub 
market have risen by 60 and 50 rigs respectively since 1990. These values reaffirm the often cited 
trend of offshore O&G projects moving further offshore and thus requiring the kinds of rigs 
capable of operating in these more challenging environments (RS Platou, 2014; The Economist, 
2010). 
 
Figure 2: Active MODU Count and Utilization 1990-2014 
 
Source: RigLogix, 2014 
The number of rigs active at any given moment is only one method of surveying the 
strength or weakness of the MODU market.  The utilization rate – the ratio of rigs currently under 
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contract relative to total number of active rigs in the market2 – provides a sounder metric of the 
amount of excess market capacity on any given month [see figure 2]. Macroeconomic shocks 
including the recessions of 2001 and 2008 were correlated with drops in utilization rates (Kaiser 
and Snyder, 2013a). Decreases in utilization rates are only exacerbated by the aforementioned 
shifts in MODU supply, most notably during the last five years. 
Decreasing utilization rates and an increase in the rig count is symptomatic of another 
MODU market trend – that of increased market participation. Despite larger firms such as 
Transocean Ltd. and Noble Drilling Corp. owning almost half of all rigs on contract (RigLogix, 
2014), the number of firms operating in the MODU market has risen from 79 in 2000 to 125 in 
2013 [see figure 3]. While the average number of rigs per firm on contract appears stable, larger 
market participants easily skew this figure. However, the number of firms with at least one rig on 
contract during a given year has followed this upward trend. This is indicative that even small rig 
owning firms are able to secure business. Concentrated market share does not mean limited 
participation for new entrants. Similar to large O&G, large firms often sell off less profitable rig 
market segments to smaller firms specializing in said segment or to newer firms looking to gain 
market entry via the secondhand market (RS Platou, 2014). 
 
Figure 3: Rig Count 2000-2013 
 
Source: RigLogix, 2014 	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While more firms can create healthy competition in the MODU market, our hypotheses 
about firm size focus instead on large firms’ ability to take advantage of economies of scale. 
First, are larger firms able to operate at lower contract rates due to lower operating costs per rig? 
Second, are larger firms more willing to cold stack or reactivate a rig due to their ability to more 
easily retain the specialized labor needed to staff a rig? Both questions are formally presented  in 
our theoretical framework section as a component of the real option and contract day rate models.  
2.1 Labor and capital costs 
The costs associated with the exploration and production of oil has increased substantially 
over time. The costs per well drilled in US (both onshore and offshore), when adjusted for 
inflation, have grown from $470,000 in 1990 to almost $3,500,000 in 2007 (EIA, 2014). The 
largest components (around two thirds of all associated costs) are the day rates paid to the 
operator of the rig and the costs of oil services (Osmundsen et al., 2009).  
The cost structure in the offshore rig industry can be well approximated by two parts – 
operating expenses (also known as contract drilling services expenses) and depreciation and 
amortization. While the companies that own and operate a rig fleet incur other expenses as well 
(impairment of assets, administrative, financial, etc.), those are of minor magnitude. 
The daily operating expenses vary between the companies. For example, according to 
information provided by Seadrill (2013) these costs amount to $170,000 per rig, while in case of 
Ocean Rig (2012) the daily operating expenses are estimated to be $235,000 per rig. The level of 
operating expenses (relative to cash inflows and reactivation costs) has a pronounced influence on 
the idling decisions (Corts, 2008). Operating expenses include the labor costs (onshore and 
offshore crew) and costs incurred when maintaining the rig to its appropriate operational 
standards while on contract. Labor costs are both significant and sticky. They can amount up to 
42% of the operational expenses (Transocean, 2013). However, the companies cannot quickly 
adjust their demand for labor according to the market conditions, as it takes time and financial 
resources to fire and hire employees. Therefore, labor hoarding is a prevalent practice that 
partially explains the incidence of excess capacity in the oil and gas drilling industry (Ishii, 2010). 
Larger companies (as measured by the number of rigs in the fleet) can offset the negative impact 
of labor costs by assigning the crew from deactivated rigs to active ones (Corts, 2008). Thus the 
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larger the company is, the more flexibility it has when making idling decisions with respect to 
labor (and thus operational) costs.   
Depreciation and amortization costs, on the other hand, reflect the sunk costs incurred 
when ordering a rig in the newbuild market or when acquiring one in the secondhand market. 
Those investments are capitalized over the operational lifetime of the rig (usually set to be 30 
years for new rigs, Seadrill, 2013). The offshore rig market is capital intensive, as the average 
construction costs of newbuild rigs that were delivered in the period 2000-2013 ranged from 
$110,000,000 to almost $500,000,000 (RigLogix, 2014).  
Rig construction costs are determined by market-wide dynamics, shipyard heterogeneity, 
and the rig’s specifications (Kaiser and Snyder, 2012). The class of the rig and its features 
determine the material, labor costs and needs for equipment. The drillships are, on average, the 
most expensive to build, followed by semisubs and jackups. Therefore, we would expect this to 
be reflected in the day rates and thus the day rates earned by drillships should be significantly 
higher than by other categories of rigs.  
2.2 Macroeconomic environment 
Between January 2000 and December 2013, the development of the factor prices could be 
characterized by substantial variations compared to that of utilization rates [see figure 4]. The oil 
price and gas prices followed each other relatively closely until 2008. Afterwards, the series 
decoupled largely thanks to the regionalized nature of the gas markets, increasing supplies of 
shale gas, and increased political turmoil in the Middle East. 
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 Figure 4: Development of deflated Factor Prices (base period January, 2000) 
 
Source: Macrobond, 2014 
The changes in utilization rates, on the other hand, showed much lower variation. As 
described above, the incidence of excess capacity in the market does not discourage market 
participants to discontinue their operations due to the option value of keeping a rig active.  
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prices seem to be inverse – pairwise comparison reveal that correlation during the period of 
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2.3 Rig types 
Consistent with the popularity of the jackups identified above, 66% of the contracts 
(almost 9,000) between January 2000 and December 2013 were written for this type of the rig. 
Contracts for drillships and semisubs constituted 5% and 29% of the sample respectively. The 
day rates charged for different types of rigs reflected well higher construction costs and more 
diverse operating capabilities of the drillships. The average nominal day rate for the drillships 
was around $316,000, while for jackups and semisubs the day rates were, on average, around 
$76,000 and $204,000 respectively.  
 When analyzing the distribution of rig types over time [see figure 5], the jackups were the 
most popular choice throughout the period, while the share of drillships peaked in year 2008 to 
11% of the contracts. Increased share of drillships is consistent with increased need to extract oil 
in more hostile environments and thus higher demand for rigs able to withstand them.  
 
Figure 5: Rig Type Distribution 2003-20133 
 
Source: RigLogix, 2014 
2.4 Rig mobility 
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most mobile units (measured as the number of contracts that were signed for operations in an 
alternative country/region than the rigs current country/region).   The share of contracts that were 
signed for drillships that required international movement is 28% over the sample period (while 
inter-regional movements represent 15% of the sample). For semisubs and jackups the 
corresponding figures are 15% (6%) and 11% (4%).  
 If we take a look at the day rates conditional on the rigs’ movements, the rigs that have 
moved across the countries charge around $190,000 in nominal terms (while those that obtain a 
contract in the same country as the previous one charge almost $120,000). The rigs that have 
moved across regions earn on average $218,000 (compared to $122,000 earned by less mobile 
units).  
 We split the rigs into two categories – rigs that have moved across regions and rigs that 
did not – and run a two-sided t-test. The test indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the means of the day rates (0.1% significance level). This difference 
combined with an increase in frequency of rig movements motivate us to investigate this issue 
closer and account for the movement of the rigs in both models.  
 
 
Figure 6: Share and Number of Rigs that Moved across Regions 2003-20134
 
Source: created by authors based on data from RigLogix, 2014 
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3. Literature review 
The empirical evidence on the factors that influence the rig owners’ decision to cold stack 
or ready stack a rig and the formation of the rig day rates is relatively scant. Data series 
availability has been one constraint (Osmundsen et al., 2012). Fortunately, as the offshore 
industry grows, the requisite data series have simultaneously improved both for current and 
historic rig activity (RigLogix, 2014).  
3.1 Idling decisions as real options 
Real option theory dates back to the seminal work by Myers (1977) who suggested that 
investment decisions could be viewed as a call option on an underlying real asset. Since then, real 
options have been a growing component of financial economics across a wide range of market 
and investment decision applications [for an overview of these applications, see Dias (1999)]. 
Commodities leant themselves particularly well to real option models given that data was more 
readily available than in other markets. Oil was one of the first commodities to be studied in a 
real option framework by Taurinho (1979). Paddock et al. (1988) created one of the earliest 
analogies to the Black-Scholes option pricing models for offshore petroleum leases. Subsequent 
literature has debated the model specification for the parameters – the current value of the 
developed reserve, investment costs to develop the reserve, the volatility of the developed 
reserve, and so on – of Paddock et al. model or a similar variation. All sought to best identify the 
size and scale of options to various investment decisions inside the oil and gas sector. For 
instance, Fleten et al. (2010) chooses a Least Squares Monte Carlo algorithm to model oil prices 
and convenience yields – price paths used to determine both the current value and volatility of the 
reserve – while others prefer a Brownian motion stochastic model (see Ruiz-Aliseda and Wu, 
2012; Ringlund et al., 2008; Dixit, 1989). While the details of this debate are beyond the scope of 
our research, a sound summary can be found by reading Dias (2004).  
 Idling behavior has been studied as early as 1968, with Mossin’s seminal work on optimal 
lay-up strategies for shipping firms under uncertainty. However, real option values associated 
with entering or exiting a given market were not examined until Brennan and Schwarz (1985) 
included a real option variable to their natural resource investment models. However, their efforts 
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shared the same parameter decisions, and subsequent complications, as the Paddock et al. model. 
Additionally, the Brennan and Schwarz model only addresses the binary decision to enter or leave 
a market permanently. Roberts and Tybout (1995) addressed both of these issues. First, they 
included parameters that allow for a temporary idling of capacity, mainly via a reactivation cost 
parameter. Second, they suggested proxy variables that could be used to implicitly determine 
whether or not real options are exercised. This arises in research, including our own, where firm 
heterogeneity is of a greater interest than an estimate of a given real option’s value.  
In more opaque and data scarce markets, the Roberts and Tybout model has provided a 
working solution to distinguish between characteristics that would increase (or decrease) the 
probability that an asset owner would exercise their option to temporarily (or permanently) exit or 
enter (or re-enter) a given market. If capital investments and sunk costs are large enough, an 
understanding of the heterogeneous characteristics associated with an option being exercised can 
add to the quantitative understanding of market participation. Up until now, this has proven 
particularly beneficial to firm and industry export behavior (Impullitti et al., 2013) as well as firm 
participation in carbon emission trading schemes (Zaklan, 2012). To our knowledge, the only 
inquiry into idling behavior in resource markets has been by Moel and Tufano (2002), who 
investigate the temporary closure of mines, and Corts (2008) who examines, as we do, the idling 
decisions of MODU owners. Temporary closures of assets have received little attention 
elsewhere. When measuring the probability that the rig is stacked or remains stacked Corts relied 
on a paneled logit model and the firm and rig characteristics as explanatory variables. Further 
model details will be fully developed in section 5. 
3.2 Evidence on rig rate formation 
 When evaluating the empirical research of rig markets, the question that has garnered 
most of the attention is the determinants of rig activity (proxied by a number of active rigs or 
utilization rates). Numerous studies have addressed this starting with the one by Renshaw (1989), 
who investigated the effect of the changes in the oil prices on the number of rotary drilling rigs in 
the US. Cheng (1998) took a step further and put forth an objective to determine whether the 
changes in the oil prices Granger-cause changes in the drilling activity in the US (both onshore 
and offshore). He found empirical support for such relationship in the long run, but not in the 
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short run. Ten years later Ringlund et al. (2008) has quantified the relationship between the crude 
oil price and rig activity (both onshore and offshore) in a number of non-OPEC regions via 
dynamic regression models. The relationship was found to be positive across the regions (with 
the long-run price elasticity of around one), but the magnitude of the effect of the oil price on the 
rig activity differed substantially. This difference was attributed to the heterogeneity in the 
structure of the industry.  
 The only authors, to our knowledge, that attempted to quantify the determinants of the 
offshore rig rates are Kaiser and Snyder (2013a) and Osmundsen et al. (2012). The latter authors 
investigated the jackup rigs in the Gulf of Mexico during the period from 1990 to 2009 and raised 
a hypothesis that utilization rates as well as real gas and oil prices have positive effect on the real 
rig rates. After controlling for rig and contract heterogeneity and utilizing a non-linear random 
effects model the authors have found this to be the case. This study also addressed the hypothesis 
that utilization rates have a non-linear effect on the rig rates – the effect of utilization rates on the 
rig rates increases dramatically as soon as the threshold for high utilization (set to be 98%) is 
crossed. In addition to this, changes in the gas prices seem to have a higher effect on the rig rates 
than the variations in the oil prices. Finally, the authors argued the factor prices have indirect 
effect on the rig rates through utilization rate.  
Kaiser and Snyder (2013a) acknowledged that utilization rates is an important proxy for 
the level of the excess capacity in the market and thus is fundamental in forming expectations 
about the future day rates. However, when studying the contracts across five regions over a 10-
year time period they found that utilization rates is a weak predictor of day rates, especially in the 
regions where the variations in the utilization levels are low (ex. in the North Sea). While 
Osmundsen et al. (2012) emphasized the importance of the gas prices, Kaiser and Snyder (2013) 
relied on oil prices only and argued for the importance of its role when determining the rig rates. 
In addition to macro level determinants, the authors also utilized the features of hedonic model 
(introduced by Rosen (1974) and used to investigate the pricing of heterogeneous good). The 
authors controlled for the rig (type, drilling and water depth as well as station keeping), region 
and contract heterogeneity and found those variables to be significant. Interestingly, after 
controlling for the type of the counterparty in the agreement (public versus national oil 
companies, NOCs), NOCs were proved to be paying higher day rates compared to public ones. 
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 Taking a broader perspective, the issue of rig rates formation is conceptually the same as 
dry bulk shipping rates. Both topics share similar characteristics and thus are attributed to the 
common field of maritime economics. The formation of the dry bulk shipping rates has been 
widely addressed (see, for example, the studies by Thanopoulou and Gardner, 2012; Laulajainen, 
2007; Beenstock and Vergottis, 1993). Vessels (assets that require considerable irrevocable 
investments) are chartered under the contracts that define the rate, the period of hire and other 
details. The rate can be expressed as the day rate, while the laycan period is fundamentally the 
same as the lead period in the rig lease market.  
 A recent study by Alizadeh and Talley (2011) established that vessel heterogeneity and 
laycan period are important determinants of the freight rates and there exist significant 
differences across routes. In addition to this, the authors found evidence that the freight rates and 
laycan periods are determined simultaneously. Variables that influence the freight rates could be 
clustered into macroeconomic, vessel, and contract specific factors. All of the clusters matter in 
the freight rate formation and thus should be accounted for (Köhn and Thanopoulou, 2011). Thus 
when explaining the drivers behind the rig rates, we form and investigate similar clusters. 
4. Data 
The data used in both our real option and day rate model come from the American data 
provider Rigzone and their subscription database RigLogix5. Specializing in the collection of 
offshore rig activity data via both public and private sources makes RigLogix one of the most 
expansive offshore databases available. Our data for both models covers 163 months of global rig 
activity from June 2000 to December 2013: a series that captures periods of significant volatility 
of both rig activity and day rates (see section 2). Better powered evidence via a larger sample size 
or longer series is generally beneficial towards removing bias from coefficient and standard error 
estimates (Wooldridge, 2012; Ioannidis, 2005). If a model was properly specified, estimates 
would nonetheless become more efficient, an inference confirmed by smaller standard errors.  
 While the RigLogix contains a comprehensive database of rig specifications as well as 
contract day rate information, our statistics of interest start with those included in the original 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 http://riglogix.rigzone.com/ 
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authors’ work. Additional variables and specifications for each model are described below and in 
section 5 respectively.  
One potential source of bias in MODU market data is the scale of offmarket or 
undisclosed MODU market activity. Our data provider takes every effort to provide as holistic 
dataset as possible: offmarket activity never represents more than one percent of total market 
activity in the data series (W. DiBenedetto, personal communication, May 28, 2014).  
4.1 Real option model data characteristics 
 The summary statistics for the real option model variables can be found in table 1. 
Variables were chosen according to their ability to serve as proxies for rig costs and option 
values: a concept more fully developed in the following section (and section 5). Due to the 
volatility seen in the rig market over our time series, our panel data of monthly observations is 
unbalanced.  
Given our interest in cold stacking behavior, the dependent variable in our model, cold 
stacked, is an indicator variable equaling one if the rig is active in a given month and zero 
otherwise. While rigs can realistically take on a number of statuses – drilling, exploration, waiting 
on location, workovers, etc. – we will initially focus solely on cold stacking in order to replicate 
Corts’ preferred model specification. This means unless a rig is scrapped (or not yet built), there 
will be no missing observations for a given rig during our series. Already stacked is similarly an 
indicator variable equaling one if the rig was stacked in the previous month and zero otherwise. 
For rig specifications and independent variables we begin by mimicking Corts’ model as 
accurately as possible6. We create dummy variables for the three major MODU rig types, and 
also include age, deep water depth, shallow water depth, and firm size in our model. Age is a 
discrete random variable equaling the age of the rig in years. Shallow and deep water depth are 
the maximum depths in feet a rig can operate (drill) at, but have been interacted with a 
deep/shallow dummy due to spatial differences in rigs’ operational capacity in shallow versus 
deep water. We define deep as anything above 600 feet and shallow as anything less than or equal 
600 feet. Due to the interaction dummy, the category a rig doesn’t fall into will merely take a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Corts’ model includes deck load for each rig. This information was missing for almost half our sample size making 
it unsuitable for missing value imputation (see Schafer and Graham, 2002).  
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value of zero. Therefore, a jackup whose operational depth was 300 feet would have a shallow 
water depth variable equal to 300 and a deep water depth variable of zero. Firm size is another 
discrete variable that measures the number of rigs per firm per region per month. This definition 
is broadened in our model specifications, and the specifics of this decision are examined in 
subsection 5.1.  
Regions have been divided using dummy variables and account for the existing MODU 
markets as defined by Kaiser and Snyder (2012). However, there were numerous geographic 
regions where market activity was small or limited (i.e. Alaska, Greenland, New Zealand) over 
the course of our series and were combined with an appropriate group based primarily on 
geography. A list of regions by respective number of observations has been included in Appendix 
A. Regional dummy variables were the same for both the real option and day rate model.  
The variables we choose to add to Corts’ model include an accommodation capacity 
variable, a region move count variable, and factor prices. The accommodation capacity variable 
is the maximum number of employees or laborers capable of staying overnight at a given rig. The 
region move count variable is the cumulative number of times a rig has moved between two 
regions prior to a given observations. Intra-regional moves, discussed previously, are capable of  
being longer or more expensive than certain inter-regional moves.  Not always observable to the 
econometrician in our dataset, intra-regional moves and are not accounted for in our analysis.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Source: created by authors 
Factor prices in the real option model are represented by the Brent spot price and its lags. 
A 36-month moving average price of the Brent spot price is also used. Brent was chosen over 
alternative benchmarks as the most common global reference price by both volume and frequency 
Cold Stacked Age of rig Shallow water
Deep water 
depth	   Firm count Firm count 2 Accommodation  capacity Region move count 
No. of obs. 107571 107571 107571 107571 107571 107571 107307 107571
Mean 0.0541 23.7163 160.1515 1470.91 46.6011 11.7749 95.9383 0.3451
St. dev. 0.2263 9.5591 137.0941 2874.573 51.8387 11.0745 27.2656 0.7599
Min 0 0 0 0 1 1 29 0
Max 1 55 394 27000 174 44 220 12
	  	   21 
(Fattouh, 2011). A moving average of Brent prices was also included due to the fact that previous 
research, most notably by Hamilton (2008) and Hooker (1996), found that crude oil spot prices, 
regardless of lag length choice, lose statistical significance as one adds data or lengthens a series.  
A 36-month moving average was chosen specifically since the three-year lag was the only 
statistically significant spot price lag when Brent was included in the real option model. Our 
initial lag length for Brent spot prices (2 years) was chosen as per the Box-Jenkins methodology 
(1970), while longer lags were included to adjust for current evidence from Ringlund et al. (2008) 
and Mauritzen (2014) who suggest that the only lags of any significance are between four and 
eight years.  
4.2 Contract rate model data characteristics 
 We follow the literature (see, for instance, Kaiser and Snyder, 2013a; Osmundsen et al., 
2012) and deflate the day rates as well as the factor prices using the US producer price index for 
oil and gas extraction industry. This allows us to eliminate the role of inflation and capture the 
real changes in the day rates as a function of real changes in underlying factors. While Kaiser and 
Snyder (2013a) investigate the effects of oil prices only, we follow the approach favored by 
Osmundsen et al. (2012) and take into account the effect of gas prices as well. The drilling rigs 
are used in the production of both resources and thus there is a certain degree of substitution that 
should be accounted for.   
As the market for oil is integrated on a global level, we apply the same oil price, namely, 
Brent spot, to all regions due to the aforementioned reason. Gas markets, on the other hand, are 
regionalized and thus different regions demand different series of gas prices (Siliverstovs et al., 
2005; Soderholm, 2000). We have matched the following gas prices to respective regions, as 
illustrated in the table below. 
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Table 2: The Series of Gas Prices (Indices) Matched with Regions 
 
Source: created by authors 
The series of gas prices (indices) are retrieved from the Macrobond database and are 
multiplied with regional dummy variables (dummies) to account for differences across markets. 
We assume that the gas prices in the regions that do not have a publicly available index are 
benchmarked to Brent spot prices. 
 To incorporate the factor prices in the model for offshore rig rates, we start with including 
both current and lagged values of oil and gas spot prices. This approach is consistent with Pesaran 
(1987) who pioneered the hypothesis that market participants have adaptive expectations when it 
comes to the factor prices – predictions about the future prices are based on past and present 
prices only. This assumption was proved to hold for the oil market (see, for example, a recent 
study by Alquist and Kilian, 2010). Similar to the real option model, we investigate the time 
series of the factor prices individually via the Box-Jenkins methodology to determine the number 
of lags (Box et al., 2008). Another approach to capture the effect of factor prices is to rely on the 
moving average of the series – a common practice to determine the trend of the market (Fabozzi 
et al., 2008). Hamilton (2008) provided support that coefficients up to the fourth lag are 
significant when investigating the formation of the oil price that is sampled in quarters. Ringlund 
et al. (2008) proposed using different smoothing parameters for different regions (the length of 
them varies from 3 to 24 months). We test 3, 6, 9, 12, 18, and 24 months moving averages to 
investigate which series has the highest explanatory power and compare it with the results 
obtained using lagged series to determine the most suitable approach.  
Recognizing that the effect of the factor prices as well as of the utilization rates might be 
non-linear, we transform those variables as well as the day rates into the logarithmic form. The 
Gas price (index) Region
Henry Hub, Close US
UK Natural Gas Index (NBPI) North Sea 
IMF, Indonesian LNG, CIF Japan, 
End of Period
Australia/Asia and Southern Asia
IMF, Natural Gas, Russian, Border 
in Germany, End of Period
Europe and Russia, except North Sea
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majority of the variables that proxy for rig and contract heterogeneity are dummies, while the 
maximum drilling depth and water depth are entered in logarithm form to account for possible 
non-linearities. Contract length and lead time are rescaled only by dividing by a factor of 1,000 
for the ease of reporting.  
5. Methodology 
5.1 Real option model methodology 
The model used by Corts (2008) predicts the decision rules that dictate when a rig will be 
cold stacked or reactivated via a real option framework. For each time period t, a rig owner will 
only stack rig i if the profits (πit) and option value (Ωit) are less than or equal to the present value 
of the reactivation costs (ωit). Formally:  
π!" +   Ω!" ≤ 𝑆!,!!! ∗ ω!"                 1  
Where: 𝑆!,!is the cold stacked indicator variable for rig i in period t taking a value of one if the rig is cold 
stacked and zero otherwise.  𝑆!,!!!  is the already-stacked indicator variable for rig i in period t-1 taking a value of one if the rig 
was previously cold stacked and zero otherwise.  
πit is equal to a rigs profits or the contract day rate minus operating costs 
Ωit is the difference in the present value of the expected profits conditional on having a rig either 
active in the market or cold stacked.  
  Note that if a rig was not stacked previously (i.e. Si,t-1 = 0), the left hand side of the 
inequality would only need to be less than or equal to zero. However, the major problem is that 
the elements required to estimate the variables in equation (1) are largely unavailable to the 
econometrician. Despite the examples provided in the introduction, operating and reactivation 
costs figures are limited at best, even amongst publicly traded rig management companies. For 
NOCs this kind of data is even scarcer. Furthermore, the requisite components of a real option 
estimate – perceived volatility, an appropriate spot price for our underlying asset, distribution 
assumptions, etc. – are complexities that while common to the real option applications (Günther, 
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2012; Dias, 2004), exceed the aims of our research efforts. To overcome those limitations, Corts 
utilizes rig and market wide proxy variables (presented in the data section of our paper) in order 
to examine what rig and market characteristics determine when cold stacking options are 
exercised.  
 Substituting these proxy variables into equation (1) results in Corts’ baseline model that 
we test for robustness: 𝑆!" = 1  𝑖𝑓𝛽!𝑋!" + 𝛽!𝑍!" − 𝑆!,!!!ω!" +   𝜀!"# ≤   0                    (2)  0      𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
Where: 
Xit is a vector of rig and firm specific characteristics. 
Zit is a vector of market wide characteristics. 𝜀!"#   is a normally distributed (white noise) error term 
 This frames the cold stacking decision from equation (1) as a binary discrete choice 
model, which we will estimate using a paneled logistic regression. Given that the majority of the 
variables for rig and firm characteristics are constant over time, this model will best be estimated 
via a random effects model and will provide estimates as to the probability of a rig being cold 
stacked or reactivated given its previous status and selected market and firm characteristics. The 
econometric implications of a random effects model rest on the assumption that the explanatory 
variables are exogenous (𝐸 𝑋!"𝜀!"# = 0 ,𝐸 𝑍!"𝜀!"# = 0   and 𝐸 𝜔!"𝜀!"# = 0 ). While potentially 
restrictive, the inclusion of appropriate time dummies will absorb any time-correlated variation 
that would otherwise be included in our error term. Huber-White standard errors are also used to 
deal with any potential homoscedasticity in our data (White, 1980).  
We also find it reasonable to assume all of the variables used in our logistic regression can 
serve as proxies for reactivation costs and operational costs, and we therefore interact all 
variables with the dummy indicator variable Si,t-1. For instance, rig age will ceteris paribus 
increase the cost of operating a rig. Older rigs will also be more expensive to bring up to current 
operational specifications when reactivated. Each variable could also be argued to have an effect 
on future expected profits (Ω!")−  as age increases, future potential profits drop and therefore 
option value should decline. This simultaneous effect of the proxies on both types of costs and 
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option value is the basis of Corts’ suggested test of whether variables from equation (2) are 
quantitatively better proxies for operational or reactivation costs. A brief summary of the theory 
is presented in the following paragraph. While it should be noted here that the majority of our 
own findings do not corroborate the inferences discussed, the hypotheses are nonetheless 
presented since option execution via rig and firm heterogeneity can still be determined from the 
model, just not to the same degree as presented in the following paragraph. 
For instance, if increasing a variable like age had a negative effect on the operating profits 
of a rig manager, this could come from either increased operating costs or decreased option value 
(due in part to higher reactivation costs). Regardless of why, our expectations of the probability 
of a currently active rig being cold stacked will increase and so will the probability that a 
currently cold stacked rig will remain cold stacked as age increases. This shared sign direction of 
probabilities (be it positive or negative) for a given variable is indicative that, despite serving a 
proxy for reactivation costs, this variable is a better proxy of operating costs. However, if a 
variable serves as a better proxy for reactivation costs, the signs of the probabilities would go in 
opposite directions. This is due to the fact that higher reactivation costs would reduce the 
likelihood of activating a cold stacked rig and increase the likelihood that a currently active rig 
will be cold stacked. 
We also account for the firm size to test potentially conflicting theories about its role in its 
cold stacking or reactivation behavior, i.e. whether larger firms are more likely to crowd out 
smaller firms via market power or would their economies of scale, which would lower 
reactivation costs and more easily retain labor, make reactivation and cold stacking a more likely 
event. If market power is the dominant market strategy, rig owners with the largest number of 
rigs would benefit the most from the increased day rates via more frequent cold stacking of active 
rigs and keeping already stacked rigs stacked. On the other hand, if lower reactivation costs and 
easier labor retention are more critical to firms’ decision making, larger firms would still be more 
willing to stack rigs, but would also be more willing to reactivate rigs that are currently stacked.  
While our results are conditional on more formal statistical results which are presented in 
subsection 6.1, our replication results of the Corts’ model lead us to two important econometric 
issues. First, the interpretation of interaction coefficients in any non-linear model must account 
for both the variable type of the interacted terms as well as the non-linear estimation of the effect 
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on a given interaction. Second, the utility of Corts’ model may not be ideal for inferring the 
superiority of a given variable as a proxy for operational or reactivation costs. We suggest and 
test additional proxies in our own model specification. 
5.1.1 Real option model re-specification 
Our model adjustments include utilizing alternative proxy variables as well as the addition 
of market wide characteristics, most notably the inclusion of Brent crude prices or Brent crude 
price trends, in Zit.  Corts did not include factor prices. Instead he relied on region, month, firm, 
and firm-month dummy variables that would capture any market-wide time variation in his panel 
data. These dummies are included in order to eliminate any bias caused by serial autocorrelation 
of the 𝜀!"# term in equation (2). However, his estimation ignores two critical issues. First, serial 
correlation could exist at the individual rig and not just the firm level7. Second, including a large 
number of dummies to absorb autocorrelation can cause a significant number of observations to 
be dropped from a given model.  This is particularly problematic in binary choice models where 
perfect or near perfect collinearity is common for independent dummy variables (Farrar and 
Glauber, 1967).  
While this doesn’t automatically discount Corts’ findings, the loss of more than half of 
Corts’ data – resulting in an average of 14 monthly observations per rig – results in less efficient 
estimates. A small per rig sampling also makes these results vulnerable to small sample bias, 
which would then undermine the external validity of the results (Stock and Watson, 2003).  
Likewise, Corts’ results may further suffer from selection bias due to the narrow time frame in 
which he examined the MODU market. The differences between the mean and standard deviation 
of our cold stacked variable – Corts’ cold stacked indicator variable had a mean and standard 
deviation of 0.53 and 0.22 while our results were 0.054 and 0.22 respectively – lead us to believe 
that his series began or ended at an extreme value relative to the population mean. The inclusion 
of factor prices is therefore an attempt to minimize the number of dropped observations due to 
multicollinearity.  By comparison, our smallest sample model still has an average of 96 
observations per rig. We also wanted our model to test the empirical evidence (Ringlund et al., 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This was addressed via a Cox proportional hazard model as the inclusion of firm, rig, month, and region dummies 
would be empirically impossible due to collinearity.	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2008; Reiss, 1989) as well as anecdotal advice from industry professionals that factor prices and 
their trends are one of the most important determinants of rig activity.  
Finally, we make three model specification changes to Corts’ model that deserve 
highlighting. First, our definition of the rig count variable was broadened from the number of rigs 
per manager per region per month to the number of rigs per manager per month. Assuming that 
even small firms think globally seems appropriate given our own empirical knowledge of inter-
regional rig movements and the prevailing belief of firms that the MODUs “operate in a single, 
global offshore drilling market <…> rigs are mobile assets and are able to be moved according to 
prevailing market conditions” (Transocean, 2013).  
This was the same motivation for including a region move count variable as an alternative 
cost or option proxy variables. While alternative variables were available to us from our data 
provider, we opted for the latent region move count variable. This would efficiently capture 
unobservable rig heterogeneity and thus serve as a more appropriate and efficient proxy for cost 
and option values.  
Thirdly, we include an accommodation capacity variable as an alternative measure of 
observable heterogeneity. While evidence suggests that staffing needs are heavily contingent on a 
rig activity – drilling versus accommodation, for example – accommodation capacity still 
provides with a measure of the maximum number of offshore laborers who would either be re-
assigned or fired if a rig was cold stacked. If the economies of scale or labor retention theory 
presented in the previous section holds true, we would expect an increase in the probability for an 
active rig being cold stacked as well as an increase in the probability for cold stacked rigs being 
brought back into use.  
5.1.2 Logit interaction terms and interpretation 
Interaction terms are commonly used in econometric models to assess how the effect of 
one independent variable depends on the sign and coefficient of a secondary independent variable 
(Stock and Watson, 2003). This allows researchers to operate outside of the assumption of a 
standard linear regression that requires all other variables in a model to be fixed. In a multiple 
linear regression, the interaction effect can be directly interpreted as the coefficient in front of the 
interacted term or β12 in the equation below: 
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 Statistical significance can also be measured via a standard t-test (Verbeek, 2012). 
However, when using the logit (cumulative normal distribution) model, the interpretation is not 
as straightforward. Recall the logit model is: 𝐹 𝑌 =    !!!!!(!!!!  !!!!!!"!")   (4) 
The interaction effect, unlike in the linear regression, is not the constant cross derivative 
with respect to X and Z. Rather, the interaction or marginal effect is highly contingent not only on 
the reference or starting point but also on the type of variable used in the interaction. For 
example, if one of our variables is continuous while the other is a dummy variable, as is the case 
in our model, the interaction effect is the “discrete difference (with respect to Z) of the single 
derivative (with respect to X)” (Norton et al., 2004). Formally: ∆𝜕𝐹(𝑌)𝜕𝑋
Δ𝑍 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!" 𝐹 𝛽! + 𝛽!" 𝑋 + 𝛽!                                                                                                                                     (5)     ∗ 1− 𝐹 (𝛽! + 𝛽!" 𝑋 + 𝛽! − 𝛽! 𝐹 𝛽!𝑋 1− 𝐹 𝛽!𝑋  
The implication of the above equation is two-fold. First, the interaction effect cannot be 
directly estimated via β12. Second, this interaction effect in probit/logit models has been shown to 
have a sign and standard error that vary significantly across the sample space. This is true 
regardless if one is considering logarithmic odds8, as presented by Corts (2008), or marginal 
effects (see Williams, 2009; Norton et al., 2004; Ai and Norton, 2003)9.  Even if the interaction 
term equals zero, our interaction effect is still non-linear and cannot be considered constant. 
Although this issue is not unique to Corts – according to Norton et al. (2004) this mistake is 
pervasive error across a wide spectrum of published empirical research – this creates 
interpretation issues that may limit the validity of any model using these types of interaction 
terms. 
 If both the standard interaction term and marginal effects are inappropriate, what then can 
be used as an appropriate estimate for the interaction terms in our model? While not an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8This is the default output for logit/probit models in STATA.  
9The ability to carry out the estimates described by Ai and Norton (2003) or Norton et al. (2004) is currently 
unavailable in STATA for all but the simplest single variable paneled logit and probit models. Our models are 
therefore unacceptable candidates for the models presented therein. 
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undisputed preference (see Mood, 2010; Brambor et al., 2006), most researchers who avoid the 
error of direct coefficient interpretation favor the average marginal effect [of equation (5)] across 
a given variable (Verbeek, 2012; Powers, 2005; Ai and Norton 2003). Therefore, we will present 
both the logarithmic odds and the average marginal effects for all of our model specification and 
estimates.  
5.1.3 A multinomial logistic framework 
Despite our larger sample size and model improvements, the composite issues of 
interaction terms and the irreproducibility of the original author’s work lead us to question the 
utility of the binary choice model in framing rig managers’ decisions. As mentioned in the 
introduction, there are alternative statuses beyond an active or cold stacked rig. Rigs can undergo 
workovers, modifications, or inspections. These decisions better position rig owners to meet the 
needs of an existing or a new client. They can also be used for exploratory drilling (typically 
short term contracts), production (typically long term contracts), or even accommodation (Kaiser 
and Snyder, 2013a). The binary choice model forces all of these categories into an active or cold 
stacked category, where the multinomial logit model provides a random utility framework (see 
Verbeek, 2012, p. 228) to put structure on the various probabilities of each status. Since order is 
irrelevant, any one status can be used as a base from which to predict the probabilities of a rig 
switching status. While losing the option based interpretation presented previously, accounting 
for available additional information would allow estimating the effects of rig and firm 
heterogeneity on the whole spectrum of rig managers’ options. 
The one drawback to a multinomial model is the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) assumption (McFadden, 1974). The IIA property suggests that the utility and therefore 
probability of any two alternatives, no matter how similar, are independent of all other 
alternatives. While the majority of rig statuses are unique, there is a case to be made in saying 
that some statuses, including workovers and modification10 or exploration and drilling, are similar 
enough to violate IIA. Following the recommendations of Hausman and McFadden (1974) and 
Amemiya (1981) we will nest similar categories and compare the estimates of the non-nested 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Workovers are typically done on older rigs needing to be brought back up to specification to remain a part of a 
firm’s active fleet. Modifications are generally done at the request of a client. However, by our data provider’s own 
admission, these definitions overlap and vary by region.  
	  	  30 
model via the Hausman-McFadden test. A reduction in categories will continue until the 
estimates from our base and nested model are no longer equal or when the IIA can be said to no 
longer hold. Table 3 summarizes how we combined statuses in our multinomial model.  
The only additions made to the multinomial model compared to the real option model 
were the inclusion dummy variables for NOCs, and OPEC countries. OPEC has been of 
particular interest in previous research as a potential cartel or oligopoly in oil markets (see 
Brémond et al., 2012; Griffin, 1985; Gatley, 1984) and the inclusion of these dummies was to test 
whether these market participants behaved any differently than non-NOC rig owners or non-
OPEC countries. These would have been included in our real option model, but resulted in a non-
convex maximum likelihood solution, and were therefore dropped.  
 
Table 3: IIA Multinomial Rig Status Combinations 
Status Freq. New Status Freq. 
Accommodation 447 Cold Stacked 5,824 
Cold Stacked 5,824 Drilling 80,755 
Drilling  76,277 Modification 10,425 
Inspection 3,297 Ready Stacked	    4,383 
Modification 5,276 Accommodation	    447 
Production 1,181 	     Ready Stacked 4,383 	     Workover 5,149 	     TOTAL 101,834 Total 101,834 
Note:  Statuses with similar fonts in Status column were combined in the New Status 
Column (i.e. drilling and production become drilling).  
5.2 Contract rate methodology 
 To investigate the formation of rig rates and take advantage of our extensive panel dataset 
we base our methodology upon the model by Osmundsen et al. (2012) who utilized a non-linear 
random effects model. However, we initiate a few deviations from the benchmark paper.  
 First of all, we account for factor prices by including lagged values or moving averages of 
the oil and gas price series. Osmundsen et al. (2012) took advantage of the function of constant 
elasticity substitution and performed the grid search to estimate the smoothing parameter from the 
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data in order to construct the price index. This was provided as an alternative to the standard 
approach of modeling the factor prices as stochastic process (Brownian motion being most 
common, see, for example, Postali and Picchetti, 2006). We rely on a simpler method to reduce 
the uncertainties surrounding the measure and thus the resulting standard errors. Using moving 
average and lagged values makes the results less sensitive to the assumptions behind modeling 
the series and thus allows for wider generalization and simpler interpretation.   
 Secondly, we do not set a benchmark of the high utilization rate (98% in the benchmark 
study) to capture non-linearities in the day rate-utilization nexus. The reason for this exclusion is 
lack of theoretical and empirical motivation behind this set-up.  
 Thirdly, we follow the approach by Köhn and Thanopoulou (2011) who investigated the 
freight rates. We cluster the determinants into macro, rig-specific, and contract-specific groups as 
well as estimate the pooled model at the end. From an interpretational point of view this helps us 
explain day rate formation from multiple angles (for example, how important is the 
macroeconomic environment ignoring the rig and contract specifics). This also allows us to 
utilize both panel data estimation techniques (fixed effects as well as random effects models). 
Osmundsen et al. (2012) relied on maximum likelihood estimation of the random effects model 
only. Due to low variability in the rig characteristics, the variables of interest could not be 
estimated using fixed effects model. Clustering the determinants into three categories allows us to 
mitigate this problem, as macro and contract specific variables show enough variability to be 
estimated. However, estimations of the rig as well as pooled models are performed using random 
effects model and thus the results should be interpreted carefully.  
5.2.1 Estimation techniques 
 We start with a simple pooled ordinary least squares estimation as the base case scenario. 
However, the presence of individual heterogeneity in observational units that is constant over 
time makes the coefficients biased and inconsistent over time. Similar to the real option model, 
we estimate standard errors that are robust to heteroskedastic and autocorrelated disturbances 
(Hoechle, 2007). Further, to allow for individual unobserved rig heterogeneity and to benefit 
from the fact that we have panel dataset, we employ the random effects and fixed effects models. 
Random effects model relies on quasi-demeaned data and thus utilizes variation between the 
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individual rigs. However, its unbiasedness is conditional upon the unobserved heterogeneity 
being uncorrelated with explanatory variables over time. The fixed effects model relaxes the 
latter condition, but fails to identify the effect of time-invariant explanatory variables and thus 
suffers from lower efficiency as compared to random effects model (Verbeek, 2012). We base 
our choice on which estimation technique is preferred for a given model on the results of the 
Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). The latter test checks for the consistency of the estimates and 
gives a decision rule on whether random effects model suffers from abovementioned bias. 
 In addition to estimating the random effects model using the feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) method developed by Baltagi and Wu (1999), as a robustness check we also 
estimate the model using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). Compared to GLS, MLE 
has an additional restriction that the disturbances follow normal distribution (Breusch, 1987).  
In the following subsections present the individual models as well as variables selected.  
5.2.2 Macro model 
Firstly, we estimate the day rates as a function of macroeconomic factors – one-month 
lagged utilization rates as well as lagged (or smoothed) oil and gas prices. 
  𝑑𝑎𝑦  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!,! =   𝛼! +   𝛼!𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙!!!   + 𝛽!!!!! 𝑜𝑖𝑙!!! + 𝛾!!!!! 𝑔𝑎𝑠!!! +   𝜀!,!   6  
Where:   𝜀!,!~ N(0, δ2) and subscripts identify contract (𝑖) and time (𝑡).  
5.2.3 Rig model 
Secondly, we investigate the day rates from the hedonic price model perspective – how is 
the heterogeneity of rigs priced in the market?   𝑑𝑎𝑦  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!",! =   𝛼! +   𝛼!𝑎𝑔𝑒!,! +   𝛼!𝑐𝑎𝑝!,!+  𝛼!𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡!,! +   𝛼!𝑤𝑑!,!+  𝛼!𝑑𝑑!,! + 𝛽!𝑋 +   𝜀!",! 7  
Where:   𝜀!,!~ N(0, δ2) and subscript (s) identify the rig and (i) the contract 
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semisub or drillship), the competitive status (competitive versus not), whether the rig has moved 
to other region, the status of the active rig (drilling, in workover, used for accommodation or 
production), and whether the rig is classified as severe environment or not.  
Taking into account the fact that rigs can be upgraded over time we also allow for variation 
in their features over time.  
5.2.4 Contract model 
The next issue worth investigation is how different features of the contract (ex. the lead 
time and contract length) are reflected in the price and whether NOCs pay different day rates 
compared to their non-NOC peers.  𝑑𝑎𝑦  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!,! =   𝛼! +   𝛼!𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑!,!+  𝛼!𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ!,! + 𝛽!𝑋 +   𝜀!,! 8  
Where: 𝜀!,!~ N(0, δ2). 𝑋  stands for a vector of explanatory variables that define the type of well the contract is written 
on, i.e. whether it is a fixed well, term or well-to-well and whether it is for exploratory, 
development or appraisal well, whether the counterparty (the rig operator) is NOC, whether the 
contract has an embedded option and a proxy variable for the firm size to capture whether the rig 
managers exercise their market power when setting the rig rates. 
 We also introduce the dummy variables to control for the time and region specific effects. 
6.   Findings and interpretation 
6.1 Real options 
 The first two columns of table 4 provide both the original estimates from Corts’ paper as 
well as our replication of the same model. The trend is that, despite maintaining the signs 
(positive/negative) of our variables, there has been a loss of significance across every proxy 
variable presented except two: already stacked and the age of rig (for currently active rigs). As 
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predicted by the real option model, the most significant predictor of a cold stacked rig is whether 
or not the rig was previously stacked. However, as noted earlier, the log likelihood estimates of 
all proxy variables have been interacted with the already stacked variable. A judgment as to the 
strength or efficiency of any of the proxy variables cannot be based solely on the coefficient 
estimates presented. Therefore, we present the average marginal effects of Corts’ model in 
column 3. 
In that respect, the only variable to maintain statistical significance is already stacked: an 
already stacked rig increases the probability of a rig remaining cold stacked by an average margin 
of 40.3%. Interestingly, the majority of our proxy variables average marginal effects are 
substantially smaller than our original estimates. While due in part to the small initial estimates, 
according to Powers (2005) this trend is indicative of sign change(s) for coefficient estimates 
[equation (5)] across the sample space of almost all our variables. The below discussion should 
be taken with the limitations of these interaction terms in mind.  	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Table 4: Real Option Panel Logit Table 
 
I II III IV V VI VII
Corts 
Original^
Corts Redo Avg. MFX Nominal Prices Avg. MFX Trend Prices Avg. MFX
Already Stacked 10.016* 18.49*** 0.403* 10.76* .005* 12.05*** .007**
1.9558 8.45 2.16 2.47 2.32 5.35 3.45
If currently Cold Stacked
Age 0.1634* 0.0231 0.00005 0.0362 0.00001 0.0289 0.000017
0.049 0.33 0.31 0.53 0.53 0.62 0.63
Shallow Water Depth -1.3813* -0.00712 -0.00005 0.00198 9.91E-07 -0.000521 -3.06E-07
0.298 (-1.43) (-1.03) 0.35 0.35 (-0.11) (-0.11)
Deep Water Depth -0.0191* -0.000223 -4.86E-07 -0.000684 -3.42E-07 -0.000381 -2.24E-07
0.0304 (-1.15) (-1.01) (-1.76) (-1.70) (-1.60) (-1.42)
Corts Firm Size 0.0359* 0.0199 0.00004
0.0155 0.79 0.72
Firm Size 0.108* 0.00005* 0.0167* 9.81E-06*
2.09 2.01 2.57 2.12
Accommodation Capacity 0.0272 1.36E-05 0.0118 6.97E-06
0.62 0.62 0.58 0.56
Rig Move Count -2.630*** -0.00131** -2.499*** -0.00147***
(-3.63) (-3.20) (-5.04) (-3.55)
If currently Active
Age 0.0999* 0.118** 0.0003 0.0515 0.00003 0.0791* .00004*
0.0488 2.67 1.32 1.5 1.45 2.36 1.97
Shallow Water Depth -0.8038 -0.00479 -0.00001 0.00433 2.17E-06 0.00262 1.54E-06
0.2374 (-1.31) (-.94) 1.11 1.1 0.73 0.74
Deep Water Depth -0.067* -0.0000789 -1.72E-07 0.000233 1.16E-07 0.000195 1.15E-07
0.0221 (-0.54) (-.51) 1.58 1.52 1.31 1.24
Corts Firm Size 0.0999* 0.0134 0.00003
0.0147 0.7 0.65
Firm Size 0.00466 2.33E-06 0.00429 2.52E-06
1.42 1.38 1.25 1.19
Accommodation Capacity -0.032* -0.000016* -0.0387** -0.000022*
(-2.31) (-2.15) (-2.94) (-2.48)
Rig Move Count 0.327 0.000164 0.325 0.00019
1.92 1.82 1.89 1.7
B -0.00161 -8.05E-07
(-0.14) (-.14)
L12.B -0.00255 -1.28E-06
(-0.24) (-.24)
L24.B -0.00906 -4.53E-06
(-0.83) (-.83)
L36.B -0.0226* -.00001*
(-2.09) (-1.97)
L48.B 0.0111 5.53E-06
1.32 1.29
L60.B 0.0265** 0.00001*
2.62 2.39
3 Month Moving Average 0.0104 6.09E-06
1.5 1.48
Rig Type Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jointly Significant Yes No Yes Yes
Month Dummies Yes Yes n/a n/a
Jointly Significant Yes Yes n/a n/a
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jointly Significant Yes No No No
No. of observations 15,129 107,533 107,533 63,919 63,919 106,491 106,491
t statistics under coefficient estimates/ z statistics are under marginal effect columns
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
^ results with standard error under estimates. Copied from Corts(2012).
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 The model is re-estimated with our additional proxy variables as well as lagged crude oil 
prices and the results are presented in column 4 and the average marginal effects in column 5. 
Moving average crude prices are alternatively used and presented in column 6 with and the 
average marginal effects in column 7. Again, only the same two aforementioned variables are 
significant. While this negates our ability to distinguish operational versus reactivation costs as 
Corts did, there are some insights worth highlighting prior to discussing model alternative. 
Principally, the majority of our independent variables appear to predict cold stacking behavior for 
either already stacked or already active rigs, but not both. 
 A positive coefficient for firm size is indicative that larger firms are more likely to keep 
cold stacked rigs stacked. However, due to the insignificance of the firm size term for active rigs, 
little can be extrapolated regarding firm size and its effect on active rigs. Likewise, the more a rig 
has been moved across regions, the less likely it is to remain cold stacked. Unfortunately, the rig 
move count proves insignificant when discussing active rigs. This could be indicative that, while 
cold stacking of active rigs may be due to reasons not captured by the model, reactivation 
decisions are based on the specifications of rigs that are captured by how often a rig has been 
moved. Accommodation capacity has both a negative and significant coefficient estimate 
indicative that rigs capable of holding more personnel on board are less likely to be cold stacked. 
However, a similar statement cannot be made with respect to currently stacked rigs.   
 With respect to factor prices, lagged prices at 36 months and 60 months (three and five 
years respectively) are the only significant lags in our model. The estimates suggest opposite 
probabilities with regard to the either term: increases in the three-year lagged value decrease the 
probability a rig is stacked, where an increase in the five-year lagged value increases the 
probability a rig is cold stacked. Note that these terms are not interacted and account for the effect 
of crude prices on the entire rig fleet, active or cold stacked. As expected, the long-term prices 
rather than spot prices, matter significantly more to rig fleet managers. However, the positive 
probability for the five-year lag is counter-intuitive. One possibility is that firms are confident 
enough, when prices increase over the long term, to take rigs out of the market and increase their 
contract day rates. The trended factor price model tells a similar story, but lacks statistical 
significance. Alternatively, this could also be evidence of oil prices oscillating mean reversion on 
firm behavior, as suggested by Pindyck (1999). 
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 The contrast between Corts’ results as well as our own is most likely due to a combination 
of the aforementioned smaller sample size and the interaction term interpretation issue. One 
simple solution would be to, as with factor prices, estimate the model across the entire rig fleet, 
without interacting any of our terms against the rig’s previous status. The nominal price 
specification of the real option model is estimated and presented in table 5. The significant proxy 
variables for cold stacking options by firms are similarly the already stacked, firm size, 
accommodation capacity, and five-year lagged factor price variables.  
 
Table 5: Real Option Panel Logit Model 2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
I
Already Stacked 13.95***
27.63
Age of Rig 0.0298
0.87
Shallow Water Depth 0.0039
1.09
Deep Water Depth 0.00006
0.41
Quarter Capacity -0.0313*
(-2.44)
Firm Count 0.007*
2.46
Region Move Count -0.0828
(-.26)
Brent -0.0008
(-.08)
l12. Brent -0.0013
(-.14)
l24. Brent -0.0048
(-.49)
l36. Brent -0.0176
(-1.79)
l48. Brent 0.0117
1.44
l60. Brent 0.0213*
2.15
Rig Type Dummies Yes
Jointly Significant Yes
Month Dummies n/a
Jointly Significant n/a
Region Dummies Yes
Jointly Significant Yes
No. of observations 63,919
	  	  38 
 The alternative to the real option model is the previously presented multinomial logit 
model. Including alternatives beyond cold stacking, these results are presented in table 6. Status 
alternatives were combined as indicated in table 3 to deal with the potential violations of the IIA 
assumption in a multinomial model. The Hausman-McFadden test comparing our nested and non-
nested models indicates that the IIA assumption is not violated. Due to failing the same test, 
further reductions of categories could not be done. These findings call us to question the 
effectiveness of a binary choice real option model, which relied on two-status categorization 
(active versus cold stacked).  
For ease of interpretation cold stacking was the base outcome chosen in the model. 
Despite the spatial variation of the signs and significance across categories, the results are more 
in line with Corts’ findings and regain the significance lost in the real model specification. 
Interestingly, age remains predominantly an insignificant predictor of rig status except for 
accommodation (i.e. as rigs age they are less likely to be used for accommodation versus being 
cold stacked). Similar to Corts’ findings, rigs capable of operating deeper, both at the shallow 
water depth and deep water depth, are generally more likely to be kept cold stacked versus most 
alternatives. This could be indicative that more highly specified rigs are generally not crowding 
out lower specified ones as proposed in the introduction, and that they are kept cold stacked 
longer barring functional or contractual necessity.  
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Table 6: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates (Cold stacked Base Outcome)
 
Accommodation Drilling Modification Ready Stacked
Already Stacked -24.67 -15.58*** -12.60*** -13.17***
(-0.02) (-20.17) (-22.37) (-12.31)
Age of Rig -0.0613* 0.013 0.0109 0.0295
(-2.20) 0.49 0.41 1.11
Shallow Water Depth 0.00305 -0.00432 -0.00936* -0.0106**
0.8 (-1.17) (-2.53) (-2.87)
Deep Water Depth -0.000283** -0.000148* -0.000123 -0.000495***
(-3.17) (-2.12) (-1.75) (-6.80)
Accommodation Capacity -3.458*** 0.376 0.212 -0.801
(-3.56) 0.49 0.28 (-1.04)
Firm Count 2.083 0.625 0.1 1.271
1.92 0.58 0.09 1.18
Region Move Count 0.0680*** 0.0691*** 0.0550*** 0.0679***
5.86 6.21 4.93 6.08
NOC Rig Owner Dummy -0.00875** -0.00326 -0.0139*** -0.00817**
(-2.76) (-1.10) (-4.68) (-2.73)
OPEC Dummy -16.65 0.482 -0.295 -0.0348
(-0.02) 0.63 (-0.39) (-0.05)
Jackup 1.973** -0.445 -1.157 -0.121
3.01 (-0.69) (-1.80) (-0.19)
Semisub -1.750* 2.998*** 3.559*** 1.726*
(-2.17) 4.03 4.77 2.3
Drillship -1.436 -0.127 -0.651 -1.345
(-1.43) (-0.13) (-0.68) (-1.40)
Brent -13.97 0.441 0.878 2.16
(-0.02) 0.28 0.55 1.34
l12. Brent -0.0083 0.00311 0.00195 -0.00459
(-0.81) 0.32 0.2 (-0.47)
l24. Brent -0.00938 0.00627 0.00749 0.00225
(-1.01) 0.71 0.85 0.25
l36. Brent 0.0218* 0.0125 0.0155 0.0121
2.22 1.34 1.65 1.28
l48. Brent 0.000845 -0.0135 -0.00933 -0.0111
0.09 (-1.54) (-1.06) (-1.26)
Number of Observations
t statistics below coefficient estimates
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
62,797
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 Region move count is the only variable universally significant across categories. The 
region move count variable indicates that the more a rig is moved, the more likely it is to no 
longer be cold stacked. Otherwise, if the rig is owned by a NOC, the probability of a cold stacked 
rig being utilized for anything, except drilling, is negative. This could also be indicative of 
inefficient or under-utilization from NOC with regards to their MODU fleet (Kaiser and Snyder, 
2013a). On the other hand, OPEC countries seem to behave no differently than non-OPEC 
countries, but given that most OPEC countries have more than just their own NOC operating 
MODUs, this should come as little surprise.  
The rig type dummies also highlight some interesting MODU market characteristics. 
Primarily, semisubs are more likely to be reactivated for anything except accommodation work.  
For jackup rigs, the exact opposite is true, and rigs are more likely to be used for accommodation 
work relative to being cold stacked. Factor prices are now generally insignificant. Trends were 
not included in the table, but were also found to be insignificant. Given the stated importance of 
factor prices this is again surprising, but the evidence indicates the majority of rig decisions are 
based more on firm and rig characteristics and less on exogenous macroeconomic factors. 
Whether this also holds true for the contract day rates earned by active rig owners will be 
presented in the results of our day rate model below.  
6.2 Formation of the day rates 
6.2.1 Macro model 
 Estimation of the macro model with respect to different specifications reveals the 
following results11. Firstly, the elasticity of the day rate with respect to the one-period lagged 
utilization rate is equal to 1.13 if factor prices are not accounted for (see column 1 in table 7). If 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The estimation was performed using the fixed-effects regression for all models except the one reported in column 6 
(for which random effects estimation was used), as the Hausman tests (not reported) indicate that there are significant 
differences between the coefficients from the fixed effects and random effects regressions. Thus the coefficients from 
the random effects regression suffer from the bias due to presence of unobserved heterogeneity being correlated with 
the explanatory variables.  
	  	   41 
we include the moving average 18-month series for oil and regionally matched gas prices12, the 
effect of the utilization rate increases to 2.49 indicating that in the short run the supply of the 
offshore rigs is inelastic and thus small changes in the utilization rates translate into substantial 
variations in the day rates (see column 4). In line with the evidence provided by Osmundsen et al. 
(2012), the development of the oil price has significant positive effect on the day rates – an 
increase in the 18-month moving average of the oil price by 1% implies increase in the day rates 
by 0.77% holding the effect of gas prices constant. 
 
Table 7: Results of the Macro Model 
  I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
  Day rate Day rate Day rate Day rate Day rate Day rate Day rate Day rate 
Util (t-1) 1.127***  2.507*** 2.487*** 3.013***  2.952*** 2.963*** 
  (11.05)  (21.97) (22.10) (10.41)  (9.88) (9.85) 
          
Oil (MA)  0.344*** 0.821*** 0.766***  0.577*** 0.176 0.237 
   (7.00) (18.20) (14.86)  (3.77) (1.19) (1.56) 
          
HH (MA)  -0.136**  -0.131***  0.0792  0.0937 
   (-3.29)  (-3.57)  -1.51  -1.77 
          
IndJap (MA)  -0.0412  -0.0695*  -0.106  -0.129 
   (-1.28)  (-2.15)  (-1.50)  (-1.76) 
          
NBP (MA)  0.0835**  0.0404  0.0456  0.0212 
   (3.10)  (1.61)  (1.30)  (0.57) 
          
Russian (MA)  0.266  0.222*  0.884*  0.509*** 
   (1.81)  (2.55)  (2.01)  (3.82) 
          
_cons 11.06*** 9.675*** 8.749*** 8.956*** 11.09*** 8.872*** 10.53*** 10.27*** 
  (433.21) (58.88) (65.79) (55.70) (115.69) (18.25) (21.68) (20.23) 
Time controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5156 5156 5156 5156 5156 5156 5156 5156 
R2 0.045 0.074 0.221 0.229 0.427 0.2434 0.427 0.429 
t statistics in parentheses	                 
*p<0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The inclusion of the lagged values selected via Box-Jenkins methodology provided less superior results in terms of 
the explanatory power as well as easiness of interpretation compared to the usage of moving average series. When it 
comes to the period during which the moving average should be estimated, the 18-month period produces the most 
significant estimates of the coefficients in front of the oil prices and thus this period is applied to all factor prices.   
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 However, in contrast with abovementioned research, oil price has more substantial 
influence compared to the gas prices. This might be the case because we look at the rig market on 
global level and thus the oil price is more widely accepted determinant by the decision makers at 
this level. At the same time, during the period of analysis substantial supplies of shale gas came 
into the US market and thus the drilling for offshore gas has dwindled13. According to EIA 
(2013), the share of non-associated offshore gases in US as of total has decreased from 21% in 
2000 to slightly less than 6% in 2013, while during corresponding period the share of shale gas 
increased from 2% to 36%. In fact, the coefficient in front of the Henry Hub prices is negative (-
0.13) and significant even at 0.1% significance level. This shows that during the period of 
analysis rig operators had to be incentivized to rent the offshore rigs despite increasing gas prices 
and thus possibilities to reallocate their production towards unconventional gases.  
 Including time- and region-specific14 dummy variables together with utilization rates and 
factor prices (see column 8) shows that the elasticity of the day rates with respect to utilization 
rates increases to 2.96. The factor prices appear to be insignificant except for the Russian Natural 
Gas (Border in Germany) moving average price series. Increase in the latter by 1% induces an 
increase in the day rates by 0.51%. This indicates that the production substitution effect is highest 
in the European-Russian region (except for the North Sea) and there was little decoupling of the 
gas prices from the oil prices. This is not surprising, as in 2012 more than 80% of the natural gas 
prices were indexed to the price of oil products (Erdős and Ormos, 2012).  Thus our analysis 
shows that once utilization, regional and time specific effects are accounted for, the gas and oil 
prices do not have a significant effect on the day rates.   
6.2.2 Rig (hedonic) model 
 Further, we investigate how the rig heterogeneity is priced in the market15. As 
hypothesized in the descriptive statistics, the type of the rig is important determinant of the day 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Note that 34% of the contracts investigated (1,864 out of 5,543) are for the US region.  
14 Initially we have also included the dummy variable differentiating between OPEC and non-OPEC countries 
instead of regions. The coefficient was insignificant across all specifications, thus we relied on individual regional 
dummies onwards.  
15 The estimations of the rig model were performed using random effects estimator, because the rig characteristic do 
not vary substantially over time and thus it is not possible to estimate the coefficients using the fixed effects model. 
Therefore, the precision and magnitude of the coefficients might be questionable, as the problem of unobserved rig 
heterogeneity being correlated with explanatory variables remains.  
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rates. After controlling for the regional and time effects, the drillships and semisubs demand a 
21.6% and 21% higher premium respectively compared to jackups (see column 2 of table 8). 
Moreover, maximum water depth is both significant and substantial determinant of the rig rates 
(in contrast to maximum drilling depth) – one % increase in the maximum water depth translates 
into a 1.65% increase in the day rate. Similar to the latter variable is the dummy indicator on 
whether the rig is classified as severe environment or not. The rig operators pay a premium of 
11.3% for this type of rig due to more advanced technical capabilities and increasing demand for 
rigs able to drill in remote locations.  
 When it comes to the rig’s operational status, the rigs contracted for offshore 
accommodation are priced almost 24% less compared to the drilling rigs, while those operating 
under workover and production statuses are priced 11.4% and 8.3% less. Finally, as postulated by 
Osmundsen et al. (2012), age is an important determinant of the day rate charged. After 10 years, 
the day rate earned by a rig declines by 8.5%, all else held constant.  
 
Table 8: Results of the Rig Model 
  I II 
  Day rate Day rate 
Moved Across Regions 0.171*** 0.0939*** 
  (6.47) (4.35) 
    
Competitive 0.0923** 0.03 
  (2.69) (1.11) 
    
Drillship 0.231*** 0.216*** 
  (3.76) (4.42) 
    
Semisub 0.264*** 0.210*** 
  (5.46) (6.65) 
    
Max Water Depth 1.331*** 1.653*** 
  (9.50) (17.56) 
    
Max Drilling Depth 0.95 1.45 
  (1.61) (1.31) 
    
Workover -0.135*** -0.114*** 
  (-4.31) (-4.66) 
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Accommodation -0.221*** -0.235*** 
  (-3.94) (-3.73) 
    
Production -0.229*** -0.0825*** 
  (-29.42) (-3.78) 
    
Rig Age -0.00908*** -0.00846*** 
  (-7.70) (-6.64) 
    
Accommodation Capacity 0.00420*** 0.00301*** 
  (6.52) (4.93) 
    
Severe Environment 0.242*** 0.113*** 
  (6.85) (3.52) 
    
Construction Costs (0.00) (0.00) 
  (-0.59) (-1.26) 
    
_cons 5.776*** 4.18 
  (4.22) (1.64) 
Time controls No Yes 
    
Regional controls No Yes 
N 5087 5087 
R2(overall) 0.6491 0.7823 
t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
 
 Interestingly, estimating the model with regional and yearly dummies reveals that the 
offshore rigs in the North Sea region earn significantly higher day rates compared to most of the 
regions. The most pronounced difference is vis-à-vis the US region (coefficient is -0.42, i.e. if the 
offshore rig is contracted in the US, the day rate paid is 42% lower compared to the rig with the 
same specifications contracted in the North Sea). This reflects a more intense competitive 
environment in the US region as well as, possibly, the inflated costs in the North Sea region 
compared to other offshore rig markets.  
 If we relax the controls for the time and region specific effects, the signs and significance 
of the coefficients does not change, while their magnitude varies (see column 1). 
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 Finally, the indicator variable on whether the rig is mobile (was moved across the regions) 
shows that rigs earn on average almost 10% more if moved from one region to the other after 
controlling for time and regional effects. This can be interpreted from two perspectives. Firstly, 
the managers of the rigs incur substantial costs when transporting the rig from one location to 
another and thus have to be compensated for that. Therefore, the coefficient serves as a proxy for 
the size of the costs incurred. On the other hand, as noted by Kaiser and Snyder (2013a), the 
offshore rig market could be characterized as regional. As a result rig managers that can move 
rigs from one region to another can exploit the discrepancies in prices. The coefficient could 
alternatively be interpreted as the size of existing arbitrage profits.   
6.2.3 Contract model 
 The third16 – contract specific – model can be summarized as follows. If we do not 
include regional and time dummies (see column 2 of table 9), the magnitude of the lead time has 
a positive effect on the day rates (extending the lead time by 100 days induces increase in the day 
rates by 1.1%). This positive premium to the lead time reflects the operators’ willingness to pay 
for reduced risk of having to contract the rig later when the start of the drilling is due. Contract 
Length, on the other hand, is not significant at 1% in any of the specifications, thus we find no 
support for the hypothesis raised by Kaiser and Snyder (2013a) that there exists a long-term 
contract premium17.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16The estimates were obtained using the fixed effects model, as Hausman test indicates that the error term suffers 
from correlation with unobserved heterogeneity in the rigs that is constant over time. 
17 Kaiser and Snyder (2013a) have group the contracts into longer than the mean and shorter than the mean average 
categories with respect to the contract length. Afterwards, they compared respective day rates. We, on the other hand, 
make use of all information we have regarding the contract length and include it as one of the explanatory variables 
in the econometric model that is of log-linear specification vis-à-vis contract length.  
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Table 9: Results of the Contract Model 
  I II III IV 
  Day rate Day rate Day rate Day rate 
NOC 0.0788** 0.03 (0.00) (0.01) 
  (2.68) (0.93) (-0.11) (-0.55) 
      Lead 0.131*** 0.114*** 0.0741** 0.0828** 
  (4.09) (3.46) (2.80) (3.07) 
      Contract Length 0.0607* 0.0546* 0.02 0.01 
  (2.49) (2.24) (0.93) (0.52) 
      Option 
-0.0721*** -0.0768*** (0.02) (0.03) 
  (-3.45) (-3.64) (-1.03) (-1.62) 
      Term 0.104*** 0.0973*** 0.0786*** 0.0775*** 
  (4.22) (3.94) (3.90) (3.86) 
      Well-To-Well (0.01) 0.01 0.16 0.16 
  (-0.06) (0.08) (1.09) (1.10) 
      Development 0.00 0.01 (0.00) (0.00) 
  (0.13) (0.73) (-0.25) (-0.20) 
      Exploratory 0.0620** 0.0652*** 0.0457** 0.0432** 
  (3.21) (3.46) (2.91) (2.70) 
      _cons 10.68*** 10.72*** 11.14*** 11.12*** 
  (576.07) (307.74) (26.48) (26.19) 
Rigs owned No Yes No Yes 
Time controls No No Yes Yes 
Regional controls No No Yes Yes 
N 3704 3555 3704 3555 
R2 0.045 0.071 0.379 0.383 
 
t statistics in parentheses        
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001        
       
 If the contract has an embedded option, then the day rate charged is 7.7% lower compared 
to the one without options. The effect is both economically and statistically significant. The 
embedded option in the contract allows for an extension of the contract (although not necessarily 
at the same terms as initial one). Information about the terms of extension is not available to us, 
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only whether the contract has the option features. The option concerns the operators and not the 
rig owners. Thus the negative coefficient reflects the economic reality – the operators accept the 
lower payment in exchange for a possibility (yet not a guarantee) of future work or, compared to 
their competitors, more work. Furthermore, our estimates reveal that if the counterparty is NOC, 
it does not pay significantly higher day rates compared to Independent Oil Company (IOC) 
holding other features of the contract constant. This evidence is in contrast with the ownership 
premium hypothesis put forward by Kaiser and Snyder (2013a) that in addition to economic 
drivers, political ones influence the decisions made by NOCs and thus the companies of latter 
type end up paying higher price for the lease of rigs.  
 Also, we infer that the rig managers, on average, do not exert their market power when 
setting the day rates18. This is in line with evidence provided by Kaiser and Snyder (2013a). Quite 
the opposite – larger firms operating in the US region that represents the biggest and most liquid 
market for leasing offshore rigs charge lower day rates compared to their smaller competitors. 
The coefficient in front of the firm size is negative and statistically significant, yet is of relatively 
small magnitude – a firm owning 10 more rigs sets a 2% lower day rate. This provides evidence 
that companies owning more rigs are motivated by economies of scale rather than increased 
market power.  
 Including the regional and time controls and re-running the model returns insignificant 
coefficients in front of the option dummy variable (see column 4). The lead is, on the other hand, 
still statistically significant, yet by a lower magnitude (0.08 instead of 0.11). 
6.2.4 Macro-rig-contract model 
 In the final model we combine all the variables into a pooled model19. The variables of 
interest retain their signs and significance, while the explanatory power of the model increases to 
around 80%. Once the regional and time specific controls are included (see column 2 of table 10), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 We start with including a numerical variable reflecting how many rigs the rig manager owns. It provides a proxy 
for the firm size. However, the initial estimations reveal that this is not significant determinant of the day rates. 
Further, we interact the firm size variable with regional dummies to account for the fact that market power is likely to 
be exercised on a regional rather than global level (results for individual dummies not reported). Note that inclusion 
of interaction terms and further inclusion of regional dummies makes the explanatory variables subject to the 
problems of multicollinearity, thus it is not surprising that interaction terms discussed above lose their significance 
once the stand-alone regional dummies are included (ex. in the specification presented in column 4).  19 The estimates were obtained using the random effects model due to low intra-variability in the rig parameters. 	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the coefficient in front of the utilization rate reaches 3.17 (in the pure macro model it was 2.92), 
while the one in front of the Russian Natural Gas border price in Germany increase to 0.35, i.e. 
1% increase in the 18-month moving average of the Russian Natural Gas prices results in 0.35% 
increase in the day rates earned by the rigs operating in the European and Russian regions 
(excluding the North Sea and Mediterranean).  
 The coefficients obtained from estimating the pooled model are somewhat higher 
compared to the ones in the rig model, but the differences are relatively small. For example, the 
rigs that were moved across regions demand 10% higher day rates compared to the ones who did 
not (while after estimating the contract model the respective figure was found to be 9.4%) and the 
drillships and semisubs earn slightly higher day rates compared to jackups. Interestingly, the day 
rates for the rigs contracted for accommodation purposes are estimated to be 33.4% lower 
compared to drilling ones (while previously this was found to be 23.5% lower). The coefficients 
in front of the maximum water depth, drilling depth, rig age, accommodation capacity, and 
severe environment variables were found to have similar effect as in previous specifications.  
 Finally, the explanatory variables that enter the contract model retain their signs and 
significance in the macro-rig-contract model, except for the lead time and dummy variable 
indicating whether the contract has embedded options. The coefficient in front of the lead time is 
small in magnitude and significance in the combined model (0.06 instead of 0.07), while the 
embedded options seem to have no effect on the day rates.  
 
Table 10: Results of the Macro-Rig-Contract Model 
 
  I II III IV V VI 
  Day rate Day rate Day rate Day rate Day rate Day rate 
Util (t-1) 1.787*** 3.171*** 
	   	   	   	    (13.80) (10.20)     
        
Oil (MA) 0.590*** 0.20 0.226*** 0.268*** 0.487** 0.481** 
  (12.25) (1.14) (4.99) (5.82) (2.77) (2.64) 
        
HH (MA) (0.05) 0.06 -0.100*** (0.02) 0.04 0.03 
  (-1.26) (1.04) (-3.68) (-0.37) (0.78) (0.63) 
        
IndJap (MA) (0.03) -0.164* 0.03 (0.01) -0.146* -0.136* 
  (-1.11) (-2.46) (1.83) (-0.38) (-2.23) (-2.06) 
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NBP (MA) 0.0958*** (0.02) 0.0820*** 0.106*** 0.01 0.01 
  (5.78) (-0.50) (8.29) (6.86) (0.40) (0.39) 
        
Russian (MA) 0.19 0.347*** 0.282*** 0.32 0.763*** 0.374*** 
  (1.24) (4.10) (4.73) (1.57) (4.10) (4.24) 
        
Moved Across 
Regions 
0.125*** 0.1000*** 0.132*** 0.127*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 
  (5.35) (4.68) (5.30) (5.00) (5.00) (4.71) 
        
Competitive 0.01 (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) 0.01 (0.01) 
  (0.38) (-0.11) (-0.86) (-0.85) (0.34) (-0.32) 
        
Drillship 0.220*** 0.219*** 0.228*** 0.226*** 0.244*** 0.229*** 
  (3.55) (4.08) (4.05) (3.64) (4.77) (4.31) 
        
Semisub 0.226*** 0.218*** 0.235*** 0.231*** 0.234*** 0.223*** 
  (5.29) (5.87) (6.42) (5.46) (6.94) (6.23) 
        
Max Water Depth 1.617*** 1.752*** 1.569*** 1.619*** 1.671*** 1.731*** 
  (12.25) (16.45) (13.66) (12.54) (17.04) (16.89) 
        
Max Drilling Depth 1.74 1.66 1.479* 1.664* 1.81 1.78 
  (1.95) (1.61) (2.20) (2.24) (1.74) (1.66) 
        
Workover -0.107*** -0.0949*** -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.0884*** -0.0968*** 
  (-3.83) (-3.70) (-4.38) (-4.40) (-3.32) (-3.53) 
        
Accommodation -0.229** -0.334*** -0.293*** -0.266*** -0.337*** -0.349*** 
  (-3.11) (-4.56) (-3.87) (-3.53) (-4.30) (-4.47) 
        
Production -0.202*** -0.171*** -0.216*** -0.204*** -0.127*** -0.121*** 
  (-7.77) (-5.33) (-8.59) (-7.60) (-4.38) (-3.85) 
        
Rig Age -0.00858*** -0.00943*** -0.00839*** -0.00902*** -0.00892*** -0.00958*** 
  (-6.30) (-7.34) (-6.65) (-6.82) (-7.03) (-7.37) 
        
Accommodation 
Capacity 
0.00308*** 0.00255*** 0.00312*** 0.00304*** 0.00273*** 0.00276*** 
  (4.15) (4.07) (4.53) (4.19) (4.57) (4.42) 
        
Severe Environment 0.132*** 0.0900** 0.132*** 0.115*** 0.105** 0.0942** 
  (3.94) (2.70) (3.88) (3.43) (3.21) (2.84) 
        
Construction Costs -0.000288* -0.000312** (0.00) -0.000321* -0.000290* -0.000356** 
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  (-2.00) (-2.62) (-1.84) (-2.36) (-2.45) (-2.96) 
        
NOC -0.0563* -0.0503* (0.04) -0.0485* (0.04) -0.0537* 
  (-2.40) (-2.30) (-1.86) (-2.01) (-1.83) (-2.46) 
        
Lead 0.07 0.0612* 0.0910** 0.109** 0.0504* 0.0600* 
  (1.88) (2.53) (2.80) (3.26) (2.12) (2.49) 
        
Contract Length 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 0.02 (0.01) (0.01) 
  (0.76) (-0.69) (0.90) (1.02) (-0.48) (-0.73) 
        
Option (0.03) (0.02) -0.0642** -0.0686*** (0.01) (0.03) 
  (-1.66) (-1.08) (-3.14) (-3.36) (-0.72) (-1.29) 
        
Term 0.0950*** 0.0867*** 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.0897*** 0.0886*** 
  (4.28) (4.67) (5.04) (4.92) (4.86) (4.75) 
        
Well-To-Well 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.15 
  (0.67) (1.23) (0.63) (0.61) (1.06) (1.12) 
        
Development (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  (-1.04) (-1.02) (-0.61) (-0.36) (-0.57) (-0.77) 
        
Exploratory 0.0430* 0.0329* 0.0632*** 0.0609*** 0.0420** 0.0388* 
  (2.45) (2.21) (3.46) (3.34) (2.81) (2.54) 
        
_cons 2.11 4.23 3.511* 2.90 2.00 2.10 
  (1.02) (1.77) (2.24) (1.68) (0.83) (0.85) 
Rigs owned Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time controls No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Regional controls No Yes No No Yes Yes 
N 3494 3494 3640 3494 3640 3494 
R2(overall) 0.7557 0.8145 0.7288 0.7368 0.8056 0.808 
t statistics in parentheses        
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001    
6.2.5 Robustness checks 
 We re-estimate the models via a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) instead of 
generalized least squares (GLS). The coefficients obtained are virtually the same with a few 
exceptions. The maximum drilling depth appears to have positive and significant (already at 1% 
significance level) effect on the day rates after including time- and region-specific dummy 
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variables. Secondly, the coefficient in front of the dummy variable indicating whether the 
counterparty is the NOC or not is not significant in any of the specifications (with or without 
controls), while that in front of the contract length is. Contract length is 0.13 with no controls and 
0.08 once time and region specifics are accounted for. Moreover, the contracts that have 
embedded options are significantly different from the ones that don’t (have lower day rates) in 
both specifications.  
 Finally, in our pooled model, maximum drilling depth retains its significance under all 
specifications when estimating it with MLE. In addition to this, lead time seems to be statistically 
significant, yet an economically negligible driver behind the day rates after estimating the model 
with MLE as compared to GLS. 
7.   Concluding remarks and discussion 
 The purpose of our paper was to empirically investigate the factors driving both rig idling 
behavior and contract day rates for active rigs in the MODU market. To accomplish this, we 
utilized existing frameworks coupled with a larger series: a dataset spanning the global offshore 
rig market. We have also provided, where possible, an econometric based inquiry as to why our 
results may have differed from the original authors’ work. In addition to this, we have revised the 
explanatory variables to be included and econometric techniques to be employed.  
 In the case of the real option model, we find the result variations are a matter of both 
econometric interpretation and sample size. Still, the real option model presented indicates that an 
already stacked indicator variable as well as firm size and rig move counts may be the best 
predictors of cold stacking behavior for currently stacked rigs. Accommodation capacity was the 
best predictive variable of cold stacking for currently active rigs, with higher capacity rigs being 
less likely to be stacked. This lends strength to the argument made by Corts that labor retention 
may be a commanding factor for rig managers. Future research may be better able to proxy for 
labor pooling for individual rigs or firms and to understand the actual effect of labor on idling 
decision. For the rig fleet as a whole, lagged factor prices are also shown to influence cold 
stacking behavior, but by a factor much smaller than was expected.  
 Given the potential econometric issues presented, we also suggest the use of a 
multinomial logistic model, which more accurately reflects the choices faced by rig owners and 
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takes full advantage of available data. With no interaction terms in our new model, the majority 
of rig characteristics regain their expected signs and significance. However, factor prices lose 
their significance in this new framework. The effect of alternative specifications for factor prices 
(i.e. stochastic modeling) and their effect on the results presented would be one avenue we leave 
to future research. The rig move count variable is our only variable to maintain significance 
across all rig option alternatives. We expect that this is most likely due to the large amount of 
heterogeneity not captured by the variables presented in our model20. This leads us to conclude 
that latent variables such as rig move counts and firm size may be the superior predictors of cold 
stacking behavior. As our strongest latent variable, future research into the effect of observable 
rig characteristics on rig movements would further help to understand the scale of unobserved 
heterogeneity in the MODU market.   
 When investigating the determinants of the day rates, we have clustered the factors into 
macro, rig- and contract-specific. One-period lagged utilization rates were the only substantial 
and significant predictor of the day rates in the macro model after including factor prices (both oil 
and gas) as well as regional and time controls. Long build times and substantial costs of new rigs 
imply that in the short run the supply of the rigs is inelastic and thus the day rates are very 
responsive to the short-term fluctuations in demand. Our relatively large coefficient obtained in 
front of the lagged utilization rates supports this proposition.  
 We have also quantified the differences between the day rates charged for jackups, 
semisubs and drillships. The latter type of rigs demands significantly higher day rates compared 
to jackups, while, as expected, newer rigs that are able to operate in deeper waters, severe 
environment and have greater accommodation capacity earn more.  Having extensive dataset 
covering the global market, we are the first ones to draw the attention to the mobility of the rigs – 
rigs that are contracted in different region compared to initial one earn around 10% more 
compared to units that stay in the same region. Moreover, offshore rigs in the North Sea earn 
significantly larger day rates when benchmarked to the rigs operating in other regions. These two 
insights give support for treating the offshore rig markets as regional. At the same time, they open 
avenues for further research on the trend towards the globalization of the offshore rig market as 
well as barriers that could slow or stop this process.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Testing alterative rig characteristics not explicitly described in our paper did not change the rig move count 
estimates. Alternative rig characteristic tests and results are available on request.  
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 The last cluster of our determinants of interest relates to the contract specifications. We 
show that the lead time has a positive effect on the day rate, while we find no support for the 
long-term contract premium hypothesis. Contracts with embedded options have, as expected, 
lower day rates and valuation of those options as stand-alone financial instruments is an 
interesting direction for future research. When it comes to the contract counterparties, NOC (that 
are renting out the rig) do not seem to overpay for the rigs compared to IOC. Firms that are 
leasing the rig seem to set the rig rates based on economies of scale rather than the market power 
considerations.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Region
Number of 
obervations
Africa other                116 
Africa west             1,475 
Asia-Caspian                  97 
Asia, Far East                689 
Australia-Asia             1,029 
Southern Asia             2,040 
Europe-Russia                138 
North Sea             2,413 
Mediterranean                507 
Canada                150 
Mexico                562 
US             7,290 
South America             1,234 
Middle East             1,571 
